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Introduction 
Like most countries in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, the independent 
majority-ruled states of southern Africa face innumerable problems, from the 
underdeveloped and dependent nature of their economies to the fragile and unstable 
nature of their political institutions. In southern Africa these problems have been 
seriously compounded by the vulnerability of these states to economic, military and 
political pressure from the Republic of South Africa. 
Since the replacement of Vorster by Botha as Prime Minister in 1978, the 
scale of such pressure has risen dramatically. Discarding Vorster's ultimately 
discredited experiment in detente, the new regime moved quickly to secure its 
interests in the subcontinent by more forceful means, ranging from economic threats 
to outright military intervention: a move that was undoubtedly encouraged by 
Reagan's accession to the US Presidency in 1980. These actions were designed to 
destabilize the economic and political systems of neighbouring and nearby states, 
and by so doing to achieve two immediate objectives: (1) the neutralization of the 
ability of such states to provide a springboard for the increasing activities of the 
ANC and SWAPO, and (2) the perpetuation of the divisions that exist within and 
between such states, thereby reinforcing their dependence on Pretoria and 
frustrating their efforts to reduce this through regional co-operation in the form 
of the newly established Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 
(SADCC). (1) A more distant but nevertheless crucial objective was the creation 
over time of a more favourable climate within Southern Africa for an alternative 
regional framework to SADCC, one that would reinforce rather than challenge South 
Africa's economic hegemony in the subcontinent. Such a framework - the 
Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) - was first proposed by Botha in 
1979, but has so far been rejected by all the SADCC states. (2) 
This change in tactics - from the detente "carrot" to the destabilization 
"stick" - has generally been interpreted as a response by the South African ruling 
class to the serious threats posed to capital accumulation and apartheid by the 
rapidly changing geopolitical situation in the region and the mounting economic and 
political crisis experienced by the Republic in the 1970s. (3) As Davies and 
O'Meara have shown, however, a less commonly understood feature of this response was 
the fact that it represented a fundamental shift in strategy as well as tactics. (4) 
As part of the new and wider total strategy introduced by Botha to combat the 
internal and external challenges facing the regime, this shift involved the 
replacement of Vorster's attempt to influence individual southern African 
decision-makers by a much more systematic attempt to shape the environment in which 
such decisions were made. In this way it was hoped that southern African leaders 
would eventually have little choice other than to comply with Pretoria's wishes. 
This new approach by no means ruled out the possibility of peaceful 
overtures and incentives, but it did imply that far more aggressive tactics would 
soon be forthcoming should such initiatives fail to produce the desired results. 
And it was the failure of the CONSAS proposals to attract support among the SADCC 
states that precipitated a determined offensive by Pretoria against their 
territorial integrity, economic viability and political cohesion. 
In assessing the ability of such states, either individually or 
collectively, to withstand this offensive and to provide support for the liberation 
struggles in Namibia and South Africa, it is important to realize that there are 
important variations in the will and capacity to resist. Whilst the SADCC states 
are more or less united in their condemnation of apartheid, there is far less 
unanimity in their degree of commitment to the tactics of revolutionary struggle 
espoused by the ANC and SWAPO, or in their willingness to expose themselves to the 
risks of South African retaliation that overt support for these movements almost 
.invariably entails. Similarly, whilst the military and economic inferiority of such 
states renders all of them vulnerable to South African pressure, some are clearly 
more vulnerable than others, the degree of vulnerability varying with such factors 
as the extent of their economic dependence on the Republic and the incidence of 
internal political divisions that Pretoria can exploit to its own ends. 
Using variables such as these, it is possible to classify Southern African 
states into a number of different groups, according to the likely extent of their 
compliance with Pretoria's demands or defiance of them. South African strategists 
have clear12 sc~fsrned this exercise themselves, and according to Davies and O'Meara 
have divided the states in the region into three broad categories: 
conservative states who are seen as real or potential 
collaborators; states considered to be the most 
vulnerable to pressure; and states whose political 
systems and development strategies are deemed to be 
the most fundamental challenge to South African 
capitalism and apartheid. (5) 
As with most typologies, however, there are exceptions to the rule. The 
Nkomati Accord of 1984 has shown that circumstances can force the most radically 
committed regime to capitulate. (6) At the other extreme, the Lesotho case provides 
an even more surprising, if regionally less significant, paradox. For although the 
extreme dependence, serious political divisions and pragmatic, if not conservative, 
leadersnip iinai; dlaracterize this small enclave state would seem.to qualify it as an 
ideal candidate for the collaborationist slot in the above classification, the 
Lesotho regime has assumed and maintained a surprisingly defiant stance against 
Pretoria. (7) 
This paper sets out to explore this apparent paradox and to see what 
lessons might be drawn from it. First, however, a brief account will be presented 
of the changing nature of political relations between Lesotho and South Africa and 
of the continuing nature of Lesotho's economic dependence. 
Changing Political Relations 
In April 1965 elections were held in Lesotho under the new self-government 
constitution that had been approved a year earlier by the British colonial 
authorities. These elections determined which of the country's two main nationalist 
parties would ultimately lead Lesotho to independence in November 1966: Leabua 
Jonathan's Basotho National Party (BNP) or Ntsu Mokhehle's Basutoland Congress Party 
(BCP). Most observers predicted a victory for the BCP, a party that was led 
predominantly by the Protestant-educated urban middle class and which advocated, at 
least in principle, radical social change at home and support for the liberation 
struggle in South Africa. The outcome, however, was a narrow win for the BNP (81, a 
party led largely by Catholic school teachers and minor chiefs, and strongly opposed 
to what it saw as the provocative and Communist-inspired militancy of the BCP. The 
BNP stood for the preservation of traditional values and institutions at home and 
for the establishment of cordial working relations with the Republic. (9) 
In the years immediately following independence, Chief Jonathan's 
government took steps to put this policy of good neighbourliness into practice. . 
Economic ties were deepened. White South Africans were seconded by Pretoria to fill 
senior and sometimes sensitive positions in the Lesotho civil service and judiciary. 
Refugees from apartheid were given a cold reception and occasionally threatened with 
deportation. And at the OAU and other international forums Lesotho became a leading 
advocate of dialogue with South Africa. 
BNP leaders defended such actions as pragmatic good sense, given Lesotho's 
geographical and economic position. But the BCP's accusation that they placed 
Lesotho in an unnecessarily servile position was clearly convincing to the many 
Basotho who regularly experienced the indignities of apartheid. Opposition to the 
government's policy and support for the BCP's new line of "realistic co-operation 
without grovelling" undoubtedly contributed to the BNP's unexpected defeat in the 
country's first and only post-independence elections, held in January 1970. (10) 
Jonathan's cabinet refused to accept this defeat and, assured that the 
police and paramilitary forces would remain loyal, moved swiftly to nullify the 
elections, suspend the constitution and assume emergency powers. (11) This 
unconstitutional seizure of power was widely condemned at home and abroad, and 
Britain withheld diplomatic recognition and aid. Pretoria endorsed the coup, 
however, and promised continuing support for the regime. South African assistance - 
including the loan of helicopters and light aircraft - proved particularly valuable 
in enabling Jonathan to suppress the widespread resistance that erupted throughout 
the country in February and March 1970. (12) By the middle of the year British 
recognition and aid had been restored and the government's security forces had 
reasserted their control. The scene now seemed set for a continuation of harmonious 
relations between Lesotho and the Republic. Within a year, however, obvious signs 
of strain had emerged. These marked the beginning of an important and unexpected 
shift in Lesotho's policy towards South Africa in the 1970s, the reasons for which 
will be examined shortly. 
Although not accompanied by any fundamental reduction in Lesotho's 
economic dependence on the Republic, the dramatic nature of the government's break 
with past policy was revealed in a number of directions: in its increasingly 
hostile attacks on the system of apartheid; in the suspension of its pro-dialogue 
initiatives at the OAU and elsewhere; in its refusal to recognize the Transkei and 
other "independent1' homelands; in its reduced reliance of South African personnel; 
in the shelving of plans to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Republic; 
it is more forthright support for the South African liberation movements; in the 
increased hospitality provided to South African and particularly ANC refugees; and 
in the controversial diversification of its diplomatic ties to include the Communist 
bloc, much to Pretoria's displeasure. (13) 
Despite assurances by Jonathan that this shift implied no threat to South 
African security or to the close economic relations between the two countries, 
Pretoria was nevertheless alarmed by these developments. Until the late 1970s, 
however Vorster's preoccupation with detente and with more pressing problems 
elsewhere in the subcontinent served to confine hostilities to a war of words. Even 
so, his warning to Jonathan not to "tempt me too far" (14), issued as early as 1971, 
served as a constant reminder of the dangers inherent in Lesotho's new foreign 
policy. With the  emergence of t o t a l  s t ra tegy,  and with Jonathan's blunt  r e j ec t ion  
of CONSAS and other  incentives designed t o  induce a change i n  policy (15),  these 
dangers were soon t o  be made vividly  c lear .  
During the  pas t  f i v e  years a va r i e ty  of des tabi l iz ing t a c t i c s  have been 
employed by South Africe i n  an attempt t o  compel the Lesotho government t o  change 
course, and i n  pa r t i cu la r  t o  reverse its policy towards the  ANC, the  Communist bloc, 
the  homelands and CONSAS. (16) Especially important has been P r e t o r i a ' s  complicity 
i n  the a c t i v i t i e s  of the  Lesotho Liberation Army ( L L A ) ,  an insurgency movement 
established by Mokhehle and other  BCP leaders a f t e r  t h e i r  f l i g h t  i n t o  e x i l e  i n  1974, 
following an unsuccessful attempt t o  topple Jonathan from power. Since 1979, 
despite divisions within its ranks and defections from them, the  LLA has mounted a 
damaging campaign of bombings, g u e r r i l l a  r a i d s  and p o l i t i c a l  assassinations aimed a t  
the v iolent  overthrow of the  BNP government. The a b i l i t y  of Lesothols secur i ty  
forces t o  contain these a c t i v i t i e s  has been hampered, among other  th ings ,  by the  
hold-up of urgently needed arms shipments a t  South African por ts .  (17) 
Although providing the  LLA with arms and with bases from which t o  launch 
its at tacks ,  Pre tor ia  has c lea r ly  been mindful of the possible cos t s  t o  South Africa 
of provoking a fu l l -scale  c i v i l  war i n  Lesotho. And it is most probably f o r  t h i s  
reason t h a t  its support has f a l l e n  shor t  of t o t a l  commitment t o  t h e  L L A ' s  main aim 
of overthrowing the  Lesotho government by force.  South Afr ica ' s  object ive  has not 
been the  replacement of Jonathan by Mokhehle. Instead, it has almost ce r t a in ly  been 
t o  force Jonathan i n t o  compliance o r ,  f a i l i n g  t h a t ,  t o  c rea te  the  conditions f o r  a 
r e l a t i v e l y  bloodless palace coup against  him and h i s  po l i c i es  from within the  ranks 
of the ru l ing  party o r  the  army, o r  both. 
I n  addit ion t o  its controlled support f o r  the  LLA, South Africa has a l so  
pursued its own i n i t i a t i v e s .  These culminated i n  the  r a i d  on Maseru, carr ied  out  by 
the  South African Defence Force on 9 December 1982, i n  which 25 ANC refugees, 3 
South African v i s i t o r s  and 12 Lesotho c i t i z e n s  died. Allegedly undertaken t o  destroy 
ANC " t e r ro r i s t "  bases - whose existence the  Lesotho government correct ly  denied - 
the r a i d ' s  r e a l  purpose was t o  demonstrate t o  the government and people of Lesotho, 
and t o  other s t a t e s  i n  the  region, the  cos t s  of defying Pre to r i a ' s  wishes. 
Although the  r a i d  provoked widespread in ternat ional  p ro tes t ,  r e f l ec ted  i n  
the  r a r e  unanimity of the  UN Security Council's condemnation, South African th rea t s  
against  Lesotho continued unabated. Refusing t o  r u l e  out  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of fu r the r  
a t tacks ,  Pre tor ia  warned t h a t  economic r e p r i s a l s  might a l s o  be forthcoming. (18) 
These followed i n  May 1983 when the  South African au thor i t i e s  began t o  impose 
serious delays on the  t r a n s i t  of people and goods a t  t h e i r  borders with Lesotho. 
This economic blockade was accompanied by increased LLA a c t i v i t y ,  a s  well a s  by 
th rea t s  t o  r e p a t r i a t e  Basotho migrant workers, and by September 1983 the  government 
had been forced i n t o  p a r t i a l  capi tu la t ion.  Of the 3,000 refugees regis tered with 
the UN High Commission i n  Maseru, about twenty, regarded by Pretor ia  a s  pa r t i cu la r ly  
objectionable, were forced t o  agree t o  "voluntary" evacuation under the  auspices of 
the UN on the  grounds t h a t  the  Lesotho government could no longer guarantee t h e i r  
safe ty  against  fu ture  South African a t tacks .  (19) Another 200 were expected t o  
follow shor t ly .  Nevertheless, the  evacuation was carr ied  out  i n  f u l l  consultat ion 
with the  ANC leadership,  and it was not followed up by any major clamp down on the  
refugees who remained o r  by attempts t o  harass them i n t o  leaving the  country. (20) 
Furthermore, despite vigorous attempts by South Africa t o  secure addit ional  
concessions a t  the  time of the  blockade (21) ,  the p a r t i a l  capi tu la t ion by the 
Lesotho government on the  refugee issue  was not  accompanied a t  t h e  time, nor has it 
been s ince ,  by any fundamental modification i n  its publicly expressed h o s t i l i t y  t o  
apartheid, i n  its posi t ion on the  homelands, CONSAS and re la t ions  with the  East ,  or  
i n  its unwillingness t o  enter  i n t o  a formal secur i ty  agreement of the  Nkomati or  
Swazi var ie ty .  
It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that in the period since 
September 1983 the war of words between Pretoria and Maseru has continued unabated. 
Nevertheless, there has been a reduction in overtly hostile acts. LLA activity has 
decreased, though not ceased, and there have been no more raids or blockades. This 
has not reflected a weakening in Pretoria's resolve but rather the use of more 
subtle and less forceful means to secure its objectives. Threats and incentives 
have played a major part in this. In addition to the possible repatriation of 
Basotho migrants, the threats have included the withdrawal of South African 
participation in the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme, a M2.2 billion project designed 
to supply water to the Republic and electricity to Lesotho. The incentives, it has 
been alleged, have included the offer of a personal gift of R1 million to Chief 
Jonathan, as well as an additional R1 million to the ruling party, in return for the 
signing of a non-aggression pact. (22) 
An additional and important strand in Pretoria's policy towards Lesotho in 
the period since September 1983 has been the transfer of South African support from 
the violent tactics of the LLA to the more peaceful ones of the Basotho Democratic 
Alliance (BDA), a new political movement established in February 1984 to mobilize 
opposition within Lesotho to the alleged Communist inclinations of the government 
and support for a more accommodating policy towards the Republic. The BDA is led by 
disaffected members of the BCP and BNP. Its chairman and leader is Phoka Chaolane, 
a former member of the Ramoreboli faction of the internal BCP. (23) And its first 
president was the former BNP minister, C D Molapo, whose outspoken criticism of 
Jonathan's foreign policy led to his resignation from the cabinet in June 1983. 
However, Molapo was ousted from this position in March 1985. 
The formation of the Alliance followed visits by Molapo, Chaolane and 
others to South Africa for talks with Pik Botha, the Foreign Minister, and it will 
obviously be able to count on Pretoria's enthusiastic support. The Catholic church 
in Lesotho, which has become increasingly critical in recent years of what it sees 
as Jonathan's dangerous alignment with Communism, can also be expected to lend its 
backing. Given the BDA's limiations, and particularly its lack of a clear 
programme, splits within its ranks, and the compromising position entailed by its 
close connections with Pretoria, it is doubtful, however, whether support from such 
quarters will enable it to ensure a modification in the government's policies, or 
indeed a defeat for them in the long awaited elections that have now been scheduled 
for September 1985. (24) If no such modification is forthcoming, then the 
possibility of a return to the open hostilities of the early 1980s cannot be ruled 
out entirely. 
Continuing Economic Dependence 
The historical processes through which Southern African societies were subordinated 
to the interests of capital accumulation in South Africa were compounded in 
Lesotho's case by intentional colonial neglect and the territory's unique 
geographical position, inhospitable terrain and limited resource base. During the 
period of British rule (1884-1966) the outcome was Lesotho's progressive integration 
into the South African economy as an increasingly impoverished and structurally 
underdeveloped labour reserve. (25) Given the magnitude of the problems that this 
situation created for the post-independence regime, it is not altogeher surprising 
that Chief Jonathan's attempt to pursue a more independent foreign policy has not 
been matched by an equally vigorous or successful attempt to achieve greater 
economic self-reliance. The continuing nature of Lesotho's economic dependence and 
the leverage that this gives to Pretoria can be illustrated through a brief account 
of the country's trade deficit, the customs union, and migrant labour. 
The Trade Deficit 
Although .official figures provide no detailed geographical breakdown, it has been 
estimated that about ninety per cent of Lesotho's trade is conducted with South 
Africa, whose road and rail networks provide the only means by which goods can be 
moved into or out of the country. (26) The actual movement of goods reflects an 
increasingly critical reliance on imports from the Republic and a declining capacity 
to pay for them from its own exports. The result has been a serious and growing 
deficit that has increased more than five-fold during the past decade and which in 
1982-83 was twenty-five per cent higher than the country's GDP (compared to just 
half of GDP in 1971-72). (27) 
Lesotho imports almost all of its fuel and energy requirements, as well as 
a very high proportion of its manufactured goods and machinery. It also relies very 
heavily on South Africa for its food supplies. Imports of grain have nearly tripled 
over the past decade. As a proportion of the country's grain requirements they rose 
from about one-fifth in 1973-74 to nearly a half in 1980-81. At the same time, the 
proportion of Lesotho's import bill covered by exports has fallen from twenty per 
cent at the time of independence to less than ten per cent today. The balance has 
largely been financed by a combination of foreign aid, customs union revenue and 
migrant remittances, a fact that has served to reinforce rather than reduce 
Lesotho's dependence. 
The Customs Union 
Lesotho's unequal integration into the South African economy is institutionalised 
amongst other things through its membership, together with South Africa, Botswana 
and Swaziland, of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). (28) Under the revised 
customs agreement of 1969 Lesotho's revenue from the common customs pool increased 
rapidly, and as a proportion of total government revenue grew from 45 per cent in 
1970-71 to 74 per cent in 1979-80. By 1983-84 it had fallen to 66 per cent. 
Dissatisfaction with the revenue sharing formula still exists, however, particularly 
concerning fluctuations in revenue and delays in payment. Although a technical 
committee agreed to a revised formula in 1981, Pretoria's attempt to use this to 
extract political and economic concessions from the other member states has led so 
far to discussions being deadlocked. Despite this dissatisfaction, SACU still 
provides Lesotho with more revenue than it could most probably raise if it left the 
union but kept domestic prices at the same level. (29) 
Apart from this, the customs agreement confers few addikional benefits, 
but several costs. Established in principle as a free trade area, SACU guarantees 
South African goods access to the Lesotho market but does little to enhance 
Lesotho's competitiveness as a production site, or in practical terms to ensure 
Lesotho reciprocal access to South African markets. For South Africa has at its 
disposal many non-tariff barriers, including its control over the transport system, 
through which access to its markets can be limited or disrupted. In addition, South 
African pressure has been applied on a number of occasions to block the 
establishment of enterprises - a Japanese motor assembly plant, an Italian shoe 
factory, and a West German television assembly plant, for example (30) - that might 
have competed in the South African market. 
Migrant Labour 
The most dramatic indicator of Lesotho's continuing dependence is, of course, its 
reliance on migrant labour. Of an estimated working age population of just over 
600,000, close to 150,000 men and 20,000 women migrate regularly to South Africa for 
work, nearly all of the women illegally. (31) This is four time the number engaged 
in wage and salary employment inside Lesotho. Following the dramatic increase in 
real wages for black mine-workers in South Africa in the mid-1970s, migrant earnings 
grew rapidly, and migrant remittances, which constitute between 60 and 70 per cent 
of earnings, have become increasingly vital to the country's economic survival. 
Ninety per cent of Lesotho's population are based in the rural areas but 
only about three per cent of rural households are able to sustain themselves 
adequately from agricultural production alone. The rest rely largely on access to 
remittances, which today account for over 70 per cent of total rural income compared 
to 40 per cent fifteen years ago. (32) Remittances have also made a major 
contribution to customs revenue, through their contribution to imports, and to 
financing the country's growing trade deficit. (33) And in ways such as these they 
have clearly helped to disguise the slow rate of real economic change in the 
economy, as well as the inadequacies of the government's economic policy and 
development strategy. (34) 
Their continuing ability to do so is questionable, however. Even if 
Pretoria fails to realize its recent threats to repatriate Basotho workers, a 
gradual reduction in the number of migrants seems inevitable, as South African 
employers switch from foreign to domestic sources of labour in their efforts to ' 
stabilize the work-force and to alleviate the critical rise in unemployment among 
South Africa's black population. One prediction has estimated that the number of 
Basotho migrants could be reduced to half the present level by the end of the 
century. (35) Other forecasts have been more cautious. (36) But what does seem 
certain is that employment opportunities in the Republic will not expand to meet the 
growing number of work-seekers from Lesotho. (37) With the population expected to 
double during the next thirty years, this will create unprecedented problems of 
unemployment, inequality and poverty, with far-reaching economic and political 
consequences, unless the government and private sector are able to improve 
dramatically upon their hitherto disappointing record in the field of domestic 
employment creation. 
Interpreting the Change 
In the light of Lesotho's continuing vulnerability and Pretoria's more forceful 
attempts to exploit this in recent years, the question that obviously arises is why 
Jonathan's government has refused to capitulate more fully than it has to South 
Africa's demands. In answering this question, it is necessary to examine both the 
original shift in policy in the 1970s and the refusal to modify this in the face of 
mounting pressure in the 1980s. 
The Original Shift 
The change in policy in the early 1970s reflected a growing awareness by Lesotho's 
leaders of the disadvantages of good neighbourliness and of the corresponding 
advantages that a more critical stance towards the apartheid regime might 
confer. (38) The most obvious defect of past policy was its domestic unpopularity, 
a factor that contributed to the BNP's electoral defeat in 1970 and which was bound 
to prove a focal point for dissent in the post-coup era. Furthermore, the 
government's expectations that friendly contact with the Republic would provide 
compensatory benefits, that would offset such disadvantages, were increasingly 
dashed. South African aid and investment proved far less than anticipated. The 
hopes that dialogue with Pretoria might help to promote genuine change in South 
Africa were also increasingly disappointed. And Lesotho's attempts to discuss the 
return of the "conquered territories" - lands lost by the Basotho in the wars 
against the Free State in the 1860s - were met with intransigence by Pretoria. 
Jonathan's growing disenchantment with South Africa was enhanced by 
additional factors. These included Pretoria's failure to consult Lesotho when 
taking important economic decisions, such as the devaluation of the Rand in 1971 and 
1975, that vitally affected its interests; South Africa's refusal to buy water at 
the price Lesotho wanted, which put paid to the proposed Oxbow-Malibamatso hydro- 
electric scheme, the most ambitious project in Lesotho's first Five Year Development 
Plan; the pressure applied by Pretoria to block a number of planned manufacturing 
enterpr ises  i n  the  ear ly  1970s; the  withdrawal of the South African maize subsidy 
i n  1977; the  f a t a l  shooting of f i v e  Basotho migrants a t  the  Western Deep Levels 
mine i n  Carletonvil le i n  1973; and many more. (39) 
A t  the  same time there  was a growing appreciation i n  Lesotho of the  
benefi ts  t h a t  might be rea l ized by assuming a more h o s t i l e  posture towards South 
Africa, benef i t s  t h a t  could prove pa r t i cu la r ly  v i t a l  t o  a regime t h a t  i n  the  
aftermath of the 1970 coup needed desperately t o  e s tab l i sh  its control  and 
c red ib i l i ty  and t o  weaken and divide those forces opposed t o  it. 
Two main advantages were i n  f a c t  rea l ized over time. F i r s t ,  the  repeated 
pronouncements by Jonathan and other  BNP leaders on the  in jus t i ces  of apartheid 
helped t o  undermine the  BCP1s claim t o  a monopoly of anti-South African sentiment, a 
claim t h a t  was f i n a l l y  discredited by Mokhehle's subsequent collusion with Pretoria.  
I n  addition, the  government was able t o  use the Republic's threatening response t o  
such cr i t ic ism a s  a weapon i n  its appeal f o r  national  unity and reconci l ia t ion and 
a s  a means f o r  diverting at tent ion from pressing domestic problems. By successfully 
s o l i c i t i n g  the help of King Moshoeshoe I1 i n  these appeals, Chief Jonathan was a l so  
able t o  mend, i f  only p a r t i a l l y ,  the serious and unpopular r i f t  t h a t  had existed 
h i the r to  between government and monarch. (40) 
Second, Lesotho's new stance helped t o  d ive r t  outside a t t en t ion  from the 
regime's obvious in te rna l  shortcomings and thereby t o  promote a marked increase i n  
in ternat ional  recognition, sympathy and support. Lesotho's enhanced in ternat ional  
s t a t u s  was well publicised a t  home by the government i n  an e f f o r t  t o  o f f s e t  its lack 
of domestic legitimacy. The most tangible benef i t ,  however, was the  rapid  growth i n  
foreign a i d  t h a t  occurred during the  1970s, which was premised f a r  more on Lesotho's 
e f f o r t s  t o  transform its "bantustan" image than on s t r i c t  c r i t e r i a  of economic 
need. (41) The magnitude of t h i s  growth and the increasing divers i f ica t ion of 
Lesotho's a i d  l inks  a r e  shown i n  Table 1. 
The rapid  inf lux of foreign a id  was used t o  finance the  major p a r t  of the  
government's expanding development programme. (42) Poor planning, ine f f i c i en t  
management, widespread corruption and many other f ac to r s  have s o  f a r  prevented t h i s  
from achieving any fundamental change i n  Lesotho's labour reserve posi t ion,  o r  from 
overcoming the  many ser ious  problems t h a t  a r e  associated with it. (43) 
Nevertheless, some outward forms of soc ia l  and economic development have obviously 
been v i s ib le  and have been exploited by the  regime t o  enhance its c red ib i l i ty .  
The r e a l l y  c ruc ia l  impact of foreign a id  was revealed, however, i n  the 
ways i t  was used t o  transform the  c l a s s  bas i s  of the  ru l ing  par ty  and t o  strengthen 
its power and cohesion. The BNP or ig inal ly  ref lec ted the  i n t e r e s t s  of the  minor 
chiefs  and the  lower elements, la rgely  Catholic and rural-based, of the  pet ty  
.bourgeoisie. During the  colonial  period attempts by such chiefs  t o  t r a n s l a t e  t h e i r  
t r ad i t iona l  p o l i t i c a l  and economic pr iv i leges  i n t o  a nascent form of c a p i t a l i s t  
accumulation i n  the  countryside were ultimately blocked by the  B r i t i s h  "reforms" of  
the 1940s which eroded much of t h e i r  former influence and economic power. (44) A t  
the same time, they were placed i n  an increasingly i n f e r i o r  posi t ion t o  the  senior 
chiefs  - many of whom, a t  l e a s t  i n i t i a l l y ,  were t o  become members of the  r o y a l i s t  
Marematlou Freedom Party (MF'P) - whose posit ion was i n  many ways entrenched by these 
reforms. (45) Similarly,  attempts by the lower petty-bourgeois s t r a t a  t o  advance 
t h e i r  own economic posit ion were thwarted by the f a c t  t h a t  the  l imi ted  but 
nevertheless c ruc ia l  opportunit ies f o r  indigenous accumulation were largely  i n  the 
hands of the Protestant-educated middle c l a s s ,  represented by the  BCP. 
During the  struggle f o r  independence these two s t r a t a  came t o  see  t h a t  
t h e i r  bes t  chance of overcoming these const ra in ts  lay i n  n a t i o n a l i s t  par ty  p o l i t i c s  
and the competition f o r  s t a t e  power. With the  victory of the BNP i n  the  1965 
e lec t ions ,  t h i s  objective was rea l ized,  but only i n  pa r t .  Their ambition t o  use the  
machinery of the state to advance their economic as well as political power was 
clearly constrained by the low level of productive forces in society. These would 
have to be raised if opportunities for state-directed accumulation were to be 
realized. And the obvious answer was a partnership, however junior, with foreign 
capital and aid. However, despite the offer of generous tax concessions, cheap 
labour and many other incentives (46), attempts to attract foreign private 
investment, particularly from South Africa, proved extremely disappointing. Save 
for a temporary boost in the mid-1970s, occasioned by De Beers' investment in the 
diamond mine at Letseng-la-Terai which was subsequently closed in 1982, foreign 
investment remained low and static, at about M5 million a year, throughout the 
1970s. (47) 
Attention, therefore, turned increasingly to the possibility of attracting 
a growing and diversified inflow of overseas aid. Jonathan's vigorous but largely 
unrewarded efforts to secure this in the period before 1970 undoubtedly helped to 
convince him that any major growth in aid would have to be premised on a change in 
policy towards South Africa. Once this change was effected, aid began to pour in. 
By facilitating a rapid expansion of state and parastatal institutions, as 
well as by enhancing their ability to allocate resources and to offer increasingly 
bureaucratic salaries, this influx of aid helped to transform the class basis of the 
BNP into an embryonic "bureaucratic bourgeoisie". (48) And the members of this 
TABLE 1 
Lesotho's Foreign Aid Receipts, 1969-1981 
Gross ODA Net ODA % of Gross Other 
$ million $ million from: UK USA FRG EC Multilateral 
Notes: ODA is Official Development Assistance, including grants and loands, 
in current US $'S. Net ODA is gross less loan service. EC is 
European Community, FRG is Federal Republic of Germany. Totals of 
percentages by source do not add to 100 since by 1981 some twelve 
other bilateral donors were involved. The most important were 
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing 
Countries (Paris: Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 1977; 1980; and 1984). 
class have demonstrated an increasing proclivity for using their salaries, their 
privileged access to state resources and their political influence to engage in 
commercial, industrial and agricultural accumulation. (49) At the same time the 
growing volume of state patronage afforded by aid was also used to co-opt elements 
of what von Freyhold has called "supportive classesM: groups, such as trade unions, 
co-operatives, farmers' associations and traders' organizations, that do not control 
the state but that can benefit from it. (50) By so doing the regime was able to 
complement the more obvious and well known authoritarian methods that were used to 
centralize power more effectively in its hands. 
This expansion in the aparatuses of the state was not financed solely by 
foreign aid, of course. Revenue from the customs union and migrant remittances also 
played a crucial part. In addition, South Africa's continuing capacity to absorb 
Basotho migrants was clearly vital if the bureaucratic class was to avoid 
confrontation with the one class that was in no way 'Isupportive", Lesotho's rural- 
based migrant proletariat. Chief Jonathan was undoubtedly aware, therefore, that 
his new policy towards the Republic, whilst conferring obvious benefits, also 
entailed risks of South African retaliation that might possibly outweigh them. In 
the 1970s these risks were clearly worth taking. The serious shortfall in foreign 
labour on South African mines, occasioned by the withdrawal of workers from Malawi 
and Mozambique, precluded any major reduction in the Basotho migrant work force 
during this period. And alternative forms of overt retaliation were forestalled by 
Vorster's reluctance to compromise his detente initiative. 
Continuing Defiance 
With the advent of total strategy, the costs of defiance rose dramatically, however, 
and Pretoria's efforts, in collaboration with the LLA, to destabilize the regime 
begen to exact an increasingly heavy toll. Economically, they inflicted 
infrastructural damage, discouraged tourism and investment, and compelled the 
government to divert scarce resources from urgent development tasks to defence and 
security, whose share of the budget rose from 8.4 per cent in 1980 to 22 per cent in 
1984. (51) Politically, they helped to compound the serious political divisions 
within the country by fostering the intra-party as well inter-party strife. 
Important rifts developed within the ruling party and the armed forces, and rumours 
of alleged coup attempts have become increasingly rife in recent years. (52) 
Nevertheless, save for its concession on the refugee issue, the Lesotho government 
has continued to resist the pressure that Pretoria has applied to secure a more 
fundamental reversal of policy. Two main reasons can be advanced to explain this. 
The first, and most obvious, was the government's reluctance to sacrifice 
the benefits that its political estrangement from South Africa had conferred. 
Access to aid, for example, has become even more vital in the period since 1979. 
Increasing quantities of aid have been required to help to provide the material 
benefits that have been used to maintain, however tenuously at times, the cohesion 
of the ruling party and bureaucratic class, as well as the loyalty of the army, in 
the face of the damaging tactics employed by Pretoria to undermine them. In 
addition, aid has become increasingly important to the regime's efforts in the 
development field. These have been characterized by a greater sense of urgency in 
recent years, as government leaders have begun to face up to the fact that their 
future survival is inextricably linked to their capacity to resolve the problems 
posed by the declining opportunities for Basotho migrants in the Republic. Any 
significant reduction in aid would seriously undermine this capacity. 
It might have been possible, of course, for the government to make more 
concessions to South Africa - a security agreement, for example - without necessarily 
threatening its access to aid. But the regime could not be sure of this, especially 
as the revelations of the extensive misuse of aid funds, contained in the Auditor- 
General's Report of 1982, had already aroused concern within the donor community 
about the continuing value of their development assistance. Donors were also 
worried by the government's lack of constitutional progress and its deteriorating 
human rights record. The promise of elections and the introduction of 
administrative reforms helped to assuage some of these misgivings. But there is 
little doubt that the government's resistance to South African pressure and the ways 
in which this was skilfully exploited to attract international sympathy were of 
equal, if not greater, importance in maintaining and expanding the influx of aid. 
The UN's approval of a $45 million programme of economic assistance in the aftermath 
of the Maseru Raid is just one illustration of this. (53) 
Other crucial advantages that the regime could ill afford to lose were the 
domestic respect that its defiance had commanded and the international standing that 
had accompanied and reinforced this. This standing was enhanced in December 1984 
when Chief Jonathan received the Dag Hammerskjold Peace Prize in recognition of his 
peace initiatives for those suffering under apartheid. Since 1983, when the 
government announced its intention of returning to the ballot box, these factors 
, 
assumed increasing importance as two of the ruling party's strongest electoral 
assets. 
Support for the regime's foreign policy has not been unqualified, of 
course. It is not just the Catholic church that feels that aspects of it have been 
unnecessarily reckless and provocative, particularly the establishment of diplomatic 
ties with thesoviet Union, China and other Socialist countries. (54) But attempts 
by the BDA and the equally pro-South African United Democratic Party (UDP) to 
harness such feelings into an effective opposition to government policy have so far 
been heavily compromised by their close connections with Pretoria. (55) 
Following the government's announcement in 1983, the scheduled date for 
elections has been repeatedly postponed, leading to speculation in some quarters 
that they might not take place at all and that the original promise to hold them was 
little more than a sham designed to confuse the opposition and assuage Western aid 
donors. In January 1985, however, the interim National Assembly was dissolved and a 
delimitation commission was set up to establish the boundaries of the sixty 
single-member constituencies for the new parliament. By May the registration of 
voters was well under way, and the government now announced that elections would 
take place on 17 and 18 September 1985. Hopes that the Basotho people would be able 
to express their choice at the ballot box for the first time in fifteen years were 
dashed in August, however, when the five opposition parties expected to contest the 
elections refused to nominate candidates (561, protesting that they could not do so 
without the voters roll, which they claimed had not been made available to them. 
All sixty candidates of the ruling BNP were therefore deemed to have been returned 
unopposed. Whatever the merits of opposition allegations of substantial 
irregularities in the electoral machinery, and government denials of them, the BNP's 
victory by default is unlikely to do much to enhance the regime's domestic 
legitimacy and international respectability, or to resolve the bitter divisions that 
have long afflicted the nation. Given this, the credibility conferred by the 
government's policy towards South Africa will undoubtedly continue to be just as 
vital in the future as it has been in the past. 
The second reason for the regime's continuing defiance concerns the limits 
of destabilization. South Africa clearly possesses more than sufficient military 
and economic might to force Jonathan into compliance or to topple him from power if 
Pretoria so wished. But, despite frequent threats to use such power, particularly 
through the forced repatriation of Basotho migrants, it is doubtful (though by no 
means impossible, of course) if they will ever be put into practice. Any attempt to 
invade Lesotho or to impose massive economic sanctions would invite international 
retaliation and could in any case prove detrimental to South African interests by 
promoting chaos on its frontiers rather than compliance with its policies. In 
addition, any attempt by the South African state to use its major economic weapon 
against Lesotho - reductions in the numbers of migrant mine workers - could well be 
resisted by the mining industry, which has a substantial investment in the skills of 
Basotho miners. Reportedly, several mining executives expressed public alarm about 
a South African radio commentary in April 1984 suggesting that tight restrictions on 
border crossings might be reintroduced if Lesotho continued to remain recalcitrant. 
When later in 1984 a threat was made by Pretoria to reduce the number of Basotho 
migrants,to 65,000 unless Jonathan signed a non-aggression pact similar to the 
Nkomati Accord, mining houses reacted by immediately requesting more Basotho workers 
from their recruiting agency, TEBA. (57) 
Although far from complacent about Pretoria's threats, Chief Jonathan has 
undoubtedly been aware of these donstraints and the limits they place on 
destabilization. And this awareness has clearly afforded greater scope for 
manoeuvre than suggested at first sight by Lesothols economic and military 
vulnerability. Attempts have been made to enlarge this scope through an energetic 
campaign to enlist support from the international community. The establishment of 
diplomatic ties with Moscow and Beijing can be interpreted largely in this light. 
For, in addition to the economic and military aid that is anticipated, the 
government clearly hopes that the presence in Maseru of two additional and permanent 
members of the UN Security Council will help to deter further efforts by South 
Africa seriously to meddle or intervene in Lesothots affairs. The effectiveness of 
such efforts to solicit international support should not be exaggerated, of course. 
The government was disappointed, for example, by the lack of American sympathy at 
the time of the Maseru Raid. Even so, Reaganfs commitment to "constructive 
engagement" has not prevented his Administration at other times, and less publicly, 
from cautioning Pretoria "against actions which would undermine or topple the 
Jonathan Government". (58) 
I n  eC!ditir\n tc thee? t ~ e  m e i r ?  nezonns, another possible motive for 
Jonathan's estrangement from the Republic, as well as for his enthusiastic but so 
far largely unrewarded commitment to SADCC, may well have been to claim a more 
prominent voice for Lesotho in future developments in southern Africa. It is far 
from certain what djrection these developments will take. Nor is it certain that a 
radical transformation in South Africa, for example, would necessarily ease the 
present regime's difficulties. Leist.ner- has argued that an ANC regime in Pretoria 
might easily be tempted to give preference t.o South African work-seekers over those 
from Lesotho. It might also be tempted to encourage radical opposition to the 
present leadership in Lesotho, or even to claim sovereignty over the country. (59) 
Jonathan is undoubtedly aware of such dangers, and his present policy might be 
construed as an attem~t to insure against them. For, as Weisfelder has argued, he 
would clearly prefer to see Lesotho as "part of the solution rather than the 
problemv1 in whatever regional change does take place. (60) 
Lessons and Conclusions 
Relations between Lesotho and South Africa have inevitably been overshadowed, and 
will continue to be, by developments elsewhere in the subcontinent, and especially 
within the Republic itself. It would obviously be unwise, therefore, to overstate 
the regional significance of the Lesotho case. In economic or military terms, 
Lesotho poses no threat whatsoever to Pretoria; nor has she ever done so, despite 
South African concern at the alleged existence of ANC "terrorist" bases in the 
period before 1983. In addition, it is doubteful in real terms - rather than in 
terms of propaganda value - whether the presence in Maseru of half a dozen Eastern 
bloc embassies has done much to enhance Pretoria's fears of a Soviet-inspired 
Communist onslaught in southern Africa. Moreover, it is equally doubtful if the 
polemical anti-apartheid pronouncements that have flowed regularly from Maseru have 
made much of an impression on Botha or his supporters, particularly as the South 
African media have not been slow to point out the irony involved in Jonathants 
support for human rights in South Africa and his denial of them in Lesotho. 
Nevertheless, it would also be unwise to treat the confrontation between 
Lesotho and South Africa, as some observers have done (61), as a minor though 
perhaps interesting distraction from the major issues and struggles that dominate 
the region. In a number of important respects Jonathan's repeated insistence that 
apartheid is incompatible with regional stability and his stubborn refusal to comply 
more fully with Pretoria's demands have proved more than a mild irritant to the 
South African regime. They have helped to frustrate its hopes for a crack in the 
resistance to CONSAS and the homelands policy. They have helped to undermine 
Pretoria's efforts to convince its allies in the West that apartheid presents no 
threat to international peace. And they have helped to dent the image of South 
African invincibility and to provide support, if only moral, to those presently 
engaged in the attempt to shatter it entirely. Whilst not exaggerating the 
importance of such challenges, the fact that they have been of some significance can 
be judged from the scale of Pretoria's response to them over the past five years. 
At the more specific level, two principal lessons might be drawn from the 
Lesotho case. Whilst the serious economic problems and social cleavages that 
characterize most SADCC states will continue to provide a fertile breeding ground 
for South Africa's efforts to realize its regional objectives, the first lesson is 
that it is surely over-simplistic to view the likely success or failure of such 
efforts solely in terms of the degree of economic dependence or the degree of 
conservatism or radicalism (political dependence) of the regime in question. As 
Daniel has shown in his study of Swaziland, for example, it was not so much the 
country's economic dependence, or the innate conservatism or traditionalism of the 
Swazi ruling class, that has turned Swaziland into "South Africa's most reliable 
partner in the whole regional network of states" but the specific ways in which this 
class established and consolidated its economic and political power through a 
compradorial alliance with foreign capital in general and South African capital in 
particular. (62) 
The Lesotho case reveals a different story. Lacking the resources to 
attract anything like the level of foreign private investment experienced by 
Swaziland, the petty-bourgeois strata that assumed control of the Lesotho state at 
independence have attempted to transform their class basis and to enhance their 
economic and political power through a different kind of alliance, with the 
international aid community, an essential pre-condition for which was a fundamental 
change in Lesotho's political relations with the Reublic. Economic relations have 
changed far less, of course. Dependence on South Africa, and particularly on the 
mining industry for the continuing absorption of Basotho migrants, has proved in 
many ways as vital as foreign aid in enabling Lesotho's ruling class to contain, if 
not resolve, the contradictions inherent in the Lesotho social formation. 
What this suggests, therefore, is that any effective analysis of the 
degree of complicity or defiance demonstrated by individual SADCC states in their 
relations with the Republic must start from a detailed examination of the specific 
contradictions involved rather than from predetermined assumptions concerning 
economic or political dependence. 
The second lesson concerns the limits of destabilization and the 
possibilities that these create for resistance t'o South Africa's regional 
objectives. The Lesotho case suggests the existence and possible future expansion 
of such limits and possibilities. With total strategy clearly failing to quell the 
rising tide of resistance in South Africa, and with Western governments moving 
towards limited sanctions, there are certainly grounds for thinking that Pretoria 
would be ill-advised to invite additional international retaliation or to compound 
its serious domestic problems by persisting with a strategy of destablization that 
might easily plunge the whole region into chaos. Surely South Africa's leaders 
should be more inclined to heed the advice of foreign policy experts, such as Deon 
Geldenhuys (many of whom, Geldenhuys included, were former apologists for 
destabilization), to move towards more subtle and less risky forms of regional 
pressure. (63) Over the past eighteen months South Africa's policy towards Lesotho, 
as well as its accords and agreements with Mozambique and Angola, suggest that 
Pretoria was beginning to do just this. 
It would be unwise, however, to generalize too much from the Lesotho case. 
It would also be unwise to assume that Pretoria's understandable preoccupation with 
its pressing domestic problems will inevitably act as a brake on its campaign of 
regional destabilization. A number of the most recent developments in Southern 
Africa suggest just the opposite in fact. Botha's threats to repatriate all foreign 
workers if full economic sanctions are applied by the West, South Africa's raid on 
Botswana and its continuing incursions into Angola, Pretoria's declaration of open 
support for UNITA and its arrogant admission that it has consistently violated the 
Nkomati Accord by providing support for the MNR, are all indicative of a readiness 
to escalate rather than reduce the level of regional tension. 
Whether such an escalation does take place, or whether Pretoria ultimately 
opts for more subtle and less violent forms of pressure, what can be safely 
concluded is that South Africa's regional strategy of destablization, whilst 
achieving temporary tactical victories, is unlikely in the long run to prove any 
more successful than detente in providing the apartheid regime with a lasting 
regional settlement or in helping to contain the rapidly mounting crisis within the 
Republic itself. 
------oooc---- 
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